WD, R. v [2025] NICA 1, January 7, 2025, at paragraphs 31 to 33:

In most burglary and theft cases the objective of the perpetrator is to take the property of the victim and use it as his own.  A personal connection between the victim and the perpetrator is not ordinarily a relevant factor in the decision to burgle or to thieve.  In cases to which the statutory aggravator is correctly applied, the act of burglary or theft is aggravated because the perpetrator and the victim are personally connected to each other, and the identity of the victim is a motivator for the selection of that person as the target of whatever criminal actions follow.  Typically, the perpetrator intends to cause physical or psychological harm to that victim via the commission of the criminal offences, or at least he is reckless as to whether such harm will be suffered by that victim.

So, in cases where the aggravator is correctly applied, there is an additional layer of malice in the formation of the intention to burgle or to thieve and an additional element of harm to be secured by the commission of those wrongful acts.  That additional element arises because of the personal connection between perpetrator and victim, and it is this which distinguishes the aggravated offence from any other burglary or theft offence.

In the present case the domestic aggravation was woven into the perpetrator’s intentions and his actions when he went about burgling this house and stealing from it.  That domestic aggravator is a matter inherent within the behaviour which is the subject of each aggravated charge. It  is the vindictive motive and the ancillary purpose of the criminal action under consideration which makes it “extra bad” and, therefore, deserving of a higher level of punishment.  That “extra bad” element should be present in each charge to which the aggravator is attached, so the imposition of a higher sentence for each charge is not double counting for the ‘same’ thing.  It is imposing condign punishment for the additional malevolent element inherent in each of the subject charges.  In the example of the present case, the higher sentences for the burglary and the theft charges are condign punishment for the appellant’s decision to use burglary and to use theft respectively as mechanisms for inflicting or potentially inflicting damage and harm on his ex-partner.  They are each separately “earned” punishments for the aggravated nature of this burglary and this theft in the context of the personal connection which existed between this perpetrator and his victim.