In R. v. Wolfe, 2022 SKCA 132, November 16, 2022, the accused was convicted of the offences of criminal negligence causing bodily harm and death, contrary to sections 220(b) and 221 of the Criminal Code. Periods of imprisonment and driving prohibitions were imposed.
The accused appealed from sentence. He argued, in part, that the driving prohibitions were illegal. He submitted, based upon R. v. Boily, 2022 ONCA 611, that the present wording of section 320.24(4) of the Criminal Code did not provide the sentencing judge with the authority to impose the driving prohibitions. Section 320.24(4) does not refer to either section 220 or 221. It states as follows:
If an offender is found guilty of an offence under section 320.13, subsection 320.14(2) or (3), 320.15(2) or (3) or under any of sections 320.16 to 320.18, the court that sentences the offender may, in addition to any other punishment that may be imposed for that offence, make an order prohibiting the offender from operating the type of conveyance in question during a period to be determined in accordance with subsection (5).
The Court of Appeal:
The appeal was dismissed. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal noted that there were “two important differences between the former s. 259(2) and s. 320.24(4). First, gone from s. 320.24(4) are the explicit mention of ss. 220 and 221 of the Criminal Code, or any other overt reference to the offences of criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm” (at paragraph 43). However, the Court of Appeal held that “s. 320.24(4), properly interpreted, continues to furnish sentencing judges with the authority to order driving prohibitions against persons convicted of criminal negligence causing death or bodily harm in cases where the commission of the offence involves the operation of a motor vehicle” (at paragraph 41).
The Court of Appeal held that section 320.24(4) “preserves the ability of a sentencing judge to impose a driving prohibition order on an offender who is convicted of criminal negligence causing death or bodily harm” (at paragraph 79). The Court of Appeal concluded that the “current provision permits a driving prohibition order to be made whenever there is a finding of guilt in relation to certain “common denominator” core offences, including dangerous operation” (at paragraphs 80 and 81):
In drafting s. 320.24(4) as it did, Parliament implemented a change that focuses on the nature of the underlying criminal activity to determine the availability of a driving prohibition order, rather than on the specific enumerated offence for which the offender is convicted. The current provision permits a driving prohibition order to be made whenever there is a finding of guilt in relation to certain “common denominator” core offences, including dangerous operation. This means that if an offender is ultimately convicted of a more serious driving-related offence — whatever it may be — a driving prohibition order will be an available sanction as long as the underlying acts prove the offender guilty of a basic driving offence listed in s. 320.24(4). This interpretation is one that the statutory text can comfortably bear and is the only one that permits s. 320.24(4) to operate consistently with the overall legislative scheme of the Criminal Code, and its related statutes, as well as the common law, while giving effect to Parliament’s intention to create a new, modern, simplified, and more coherent system to better deter criminal driving behaviour.
In short, s. 320.24(4) continues to permit sentencing judges to impose driving prohibition orders against offenders for the offences of criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm. The driving prohibition orders made against Mr. Wolfe in this case were lawful.
