The King v Ryan Churchill (a pseudonym) [2025] HCA 11, April 2, 2025, at paragraphs 3 and 4:
In a trial of a sexual offence in Victoria, evidence that a complainant was distressed at the time of making a pre-trial complaint is ordinarily relevant and admissible. It is relevant within the meaning of s 55 of the Evidence Act on either or both of two bases: as evidence that, if accepted, could, first, enhance the credit of the complainant if the jury were to find a causal connection between the distress and the making of the complaint and, second, support the occurrence of the offending if the jury were to find a causal connection between the distress and the offending. On either basis, the evidence could rationally indirectly affect the assessment of the probability of the existence of a fact in issue – namely, whether the offending occurred – and is therefore relevant within the meaning of s 55. Consequently, it is admissible in a trial of a sexual offence under s 56 of the Evidence Act.
Evidence that a complainant was distressed at the time of making a pre-trial complaint is not evidence “of a kind that may be unreliable” under the Jury Directions Act. Therefore, the Jury Directions Act does not permit a prosecutor or defence counsel to request the trial judge to direct the jury that such evidence is “of a kind that may be unreliable”. Any rule of the common law to the contrary is abolished. Where that evidence is admitted as indirect or circumstantial evidence of the offending conduct, it is for the jury to determine whether to accept the evidence and the weight to be given to that evidence. The use of such evidence as indirect or circumstantial evidence can be addressed by appropriate general directions as to the drawing of conclusions and the distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence. Where there is no request for such a direction, then the trial judge is only obliged to so direct a jury if the trial judge considers there are substantial and compelling reasons for doing so in the particular case.